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This is the authors’ accepted version of a paper which later appeared as: 
Hoang, D. and Jones, B., 2012. Why do corporate codes of conduct fail? Women workers and 
clothing supply chains in Vietnam. Global Social Policy, 12 (1), pp. 67-85. 
 
Abstract 
Despite criticisms of their derivation and implementation, corporate codes of conduct (CoCs) 
continue to dominate debates on Corporate Social Responsibility and the informal regulation of 
worker exploitation and abuse by ‘sweatshops’ supplying Northern multinational corporations 
(MNCs). Through analytical interrogation of existing literature and empirical evidence from 
Vietnamese case studies, two propositions are made to clarify CoCs’ poor performance. It is 
argued, firstly, that the extent of MNCs’ control over their subcontracting suppliers is 
misconceived and over-estimated because supply chains function more like networks than the 
hierarchies assumed by ‘principal-agent’ preconceptions. Conceptualizing such relationships 
instead as networks of conflicting political and economic imperatives amongst various sets of 
actors facilitates a second proposition derived from our case studies. The factory workers, their 
subcontractor employers, intermediary vendors and even the MNCs seeking CoC commitments, 
have convergent interests in violating key aspects of the codes and deceiving their auditors. The 
analysis evaluates CoCs’ residual value in light of these constraints and the options for 
improving labour regulation, with particular reference to the plight of disadvantaged women 
workers. 
 
Keywords 
sweatshop labour, codes of conduct, corporate social responsibility, supply chains, women 
workers 
Corporate codes of conduct (CoCs) have become a critical aspect of debates over 
business responsibilities to improve abuse and exploitation of workers in developing society 
suppliers. Attention has focussed particularly upon high profile, ‘brand’ corporations sourcing 
goods such as footwear and clothing for retailers and consumers in the global ‘North’. The public 
aims of CoCs are: to improve the material welfare of workers in contract suppliers’ factories, to 
curb or remove arbitrary and coercive exercises of managerial power and authority there, and to 
substantiate workers’ human rights in areas such as freedom of association and gender rights. 
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A snap verdict of CoC effectiveness in these areas would be largely negative (Raworth 
and Coryndon, 2004; Waronwant, 2008; Hale and Wills, 2007).  With ineffective monitoring and 
unauthorised subcontracting, brands and retailers often fail to track their producers and hence 
enforce CoCs—not only at factories in developing countries (Level Works, 2009), but even in 
the heartland of some brands’ headquarters in the UK (Dispatches, 2010).  Through new 
evidence from garment factories in Vietnam, we challenge and investigate a key assumption of 
both CoC supporters and some critics: the feasibility of a unilinear corporate chain of command 
through supply firms’ managements into local workplaces. 
 We focus, first, upon oversimplifications of corporate power and control, presupposing an 
underlying principal-agent conception, in many—especially prescriptive accounts—of corporate 
responsibility via CoCs. This part of the analysis derives from existing accounts which point to 
the importance of a wider complex of institutional relationships within which MNC transactions 
operate: both the globalised industrial and market structures of the clothing industry and the 
varying socio-political and cultural contexts affecting sweatshop supplier enterprises.  The 
second focus links this ‘macro’ analysis with new micro-level data on CoC changes and the 
political economy of labour relations amongst clothing workers and firms in Vietnam. This data 
informs our second, and more distinctive argument: that a convergence of interests amongst 
MNC buyers, vendors, supplying firms, workers, unions, and the Vietnamese state is a more 
powerful argument than deficiencies in the codes’ application. 
These arguments are developed in four sections. The first outlines the general debates over 
the purposes and role of CoCs in supply relationships between western MNCs and contractors in 
developing societies. The second section examines the complications posed for these 
arrangements by the complex economics and social institutions governing supply chains. The 
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third section presents the evidence on work, employment, and CoC implementation from case 
studies of clothing firms in Vietnam. Fourthly, based on the same data, we assess the 
implications of convergent interests in the violation of CoCs and of dysfunctional labour 
regulation for the wider weaknesses of codes and Vietnamese employment relationships. The 
conclusion offers possible policy ideas for more effective regulation of employee welfare in 
Vietnamese private-sector workplaces.  
 
1. Seller-supplier relationships and codes of conduct 
The globalisation of industrial production was soon accompanied by civil society 
campaigns against MNCs’ exploitative and environmentally regressive ‘offshoring’ of operations 
to lower their product prices. These ethical campaigns interacted with the spread of philosophies 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) amongst western industries, governments, and media 
(Vogel, 2006; Jones, 2007; Kindermann, 2009). Responding to such campaigns, multinational 
corporations (MNCs) began building standard-setting rules from newly adopted (or adapted) 
CoCs into their contracts with suppliers, in the cheap-labour economies of southern and central 
America and East Asia. 
Despite persistent anti-sweatshop campaigns by NGOs and proliferating labour auditing 
activities by MNCs, CoC effectiveness remains problematic. Recent studies (e.g. Berik and 
Rodgers, 2010) still find glaring inadequacies, such as the MNCs’ failure to pay minimum wage 
standards, low rates of union participation, and unions’ failure to protect workers’ rights. 
Explanations for continued shortcomings range from suggestions that patchy compliance with 
CoCs reflects inadequacies in the  legal regulations of the host country (Locke, Kochan, Romis 
and Qin, 2007), to arguments that suppliers’ management styles influence the quality of firms’ 
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social performance (Frenkel and Scott, 2002). Investigating suppliers’ commitment, Jiang (2009: 
97) claims that even the ‘promise’ of long-term contracts with suppliers is insufficient to obtain 
compliance. Closer to the action, MNC critics focus on the poor implementation and 
enforcement of CoCs, citing the unsuitability of profit-prioritising auditors, their limited 
understanding of human rights and labour issues (Laric, 1999), and their focus on measurable 
standards like working hours and wages rather than rights-based elements such as: freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, harassment, and discrimination (MSN, 2004; Wells, 2007). 
As we shall see later, it is also questionable why suppliers should improve their compliance 
when they have less to gain from the codes than the MNCs initiating them. 
There are, however, two under-examined aspects of global supply chains in existing 
commentaries and campaigns for more ethical sourcing and CoCs. Firstly, implications of the 
complexity of the economic relationships and transactions, while documented, may not be fully 
considered. Supply chains are not unidirectional and mono-causal channels of communication 
and authority. Secondly, despite some sincerity in CoC promotion (Hartman, Arnold and 
Wokutch, 2003; Hurst, Murdoch and Gould, 2005; LBL, 2009), MNCs and others fail to 
acknowledge contradictions between the logic of the codes and the economic priorities which 
MNCs and their markets dictate. These contradictions induce a convergence of interests amongst 
various actors in the chains, which we examine below.  
As far as the complexity aspect is concerned, other actors’ roles and positions in the 
chain, especially middle-tier suppliers, are insufficiently addressed. Acting as bridges between 
the sweatshops, the MNCs, andthe high street retailers, these suppliers can either enhance or 
hinder the ethical practices initiated by the brands. Without full consideration of their influence 
and moral stance, the ethical supply chain may remain at the top and less likely to filter down to 
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the ‘bottom’. Relevant ethical supply chain analysis, however, often tends to simplify the 
connections, treating them as direct buyer-supplier relationships, although the latter may only 
partially exist in practice. It might be more accurate to refer to the complexes of transactions 
involved not as chains, but as networks with bi-directional and simultaneous flows (Lamming, 
Johnsen, Zheng and Harland, 2000; Nassimbeni, 2004). Explicit or indirect assumptions of the 
relationships as the ‘principal-agent’ conception of economic theory might be more accurately 
replaced by treating the actors in the supply network as ‘legally independent but economically 
interdependent’ (Nassimbeni, 2004: 46). 
 
2. Supply network governance 
i) Economic complexity 
If clothing production suppliers were organisationally integrated or closely affiliated with the 
brand retailers of the global North, CoC imposition and management could be relatively 
unproblematic. But suppliers in the South have varying degrees of independence and 
organisational separation from buying corporations by location and geographic distance, which is 
increased by varying relational and contractual links such as intermediary ‘middlemen’ firms. So 
the first dimension of complexity concerns the range of customers supplied by producers in 
lower tiers of production chains. CoC debates and advocacy argue as though suppliers are direct 
dependants of their Western buyers, but suppliers may depend not on a single buyer but on a 
number of traders or middle-tier suppliers having limited or no responsibility for ethical sourcing 
(Chan and Wang, 2004). The middle tier often supplies in large volumes from many factories 
together. The results of Dong Hoang’s interviews show that some garment factories in Vietnam 
are supplying more than thirty customers and brands without direct contracts with brands and 
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retailers, only with their middle-tier suppliers. Among buying firms, there were approximately 
twenty requests for compliance with clients’ CoCs, but no requirements from the remaining ten 
‘'middlemen'’ (Hoang, 2008).  
From one side, apparent increases in the size and scope of many MNCs through mergers 
and acquisitions result in higher levels of hierarchy, business control, and concentration of 
corporate power, but from the other, these also contribute to the addition of hundreds of 
thousands of contractors and, often small, developing country subcontractors in their supply 
chains. In industries like clothing, production chains can descend as far as the informal sector 
and homework (Moody, 1997). Such proliferation encourages the growth of middle-tier suppliers 
as bridges between buyers and small producers. In clothing and footwear, in particular, multiple 
tiers may specialise in different processes in the ‘chain’ (Hurley, 2005); MNC controls within 
this proliferation are uncertain. The assumption of MNC dominance is particularly problematised 
by the emergence of giant transnational East Asian contractors (Appelbaum 2008) to powerful 
positions in the global supply chains. Consider, for example, Hong Kong-based clothing supplier 
Li and Fung, which sources about 25% of clothing exports from Vietnam (Meredith, 2006), and 
Taiwanese athletic footwear manufacturer Pou Chen. Li and Fung’s growth over the last fifteen 
year appears to exceed that of many Western brands and retailers who struggle with rising 
production costs (Chen, 2011; Meredith, 2006). Yue Yuen Company, which provides about 17% 
of global supplies of athletic shoes of more than 30 well-known brands including Nike, Adidas, 
and Reebook, enjoyed significant growth, with net profits in 2002 higher than Adidas and 
Reebook (Merk, 2008). Such large, yet almost unknown suppliers are thus unlikely to be over-
dependent on a single brand. Moreover, small subcontractors’ attitudes to CoC injunctions will 
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depend more on their relationships with giant contractors or their direct buyers rather than on the 
(usually Northern) brand firms initiating such codes. 
Economic ‘value chain’ governance has usually been viewed as ‘an organization’s ability 
to define and enforce production parameters and product attributes’, including the control of 
decision-making processes, forms of horizontal coordination, and performance verification that 
‘influence[s] the distribution of revenues along the chain’(von Hagen and Alvarez, 2011: 21). 
But the increasing infiltration of private standards of employment and environmental scope has, 
implicitly, broadened governance to the much more diffuse sphere of social responsibilities (von 
Hagen and Alvarez, 2011: 17). Naturally, these levels and forms of production and product 
control may confer detailed MNC controls over supply chain economics. However, it does not 
follow that there will be comparable controls over the social dimensions of governance relations. 
Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) distinguish a continuum of economic authority, ranging 
from high control in ‘captive’ subcontractors and ‘hierarchical governance’ of subsidiaries and 
affiliates, through more medium control levels, in ‘relational’ and ‘modular’ value chains, to the 
extremely loose relationships of market transactions between MNCs and independent suppliers. 
But the model acknowledges the above-mentioned complications from the rise of intermediary 
firms which distribute MNC contracts to second and third tiers in the supply chain (Gereffi et al., 
2005: 83-7; 91-2). If, in the one-dimensional sphere of production control, MNCs’ economic 
governance is so complicated and diluted, then it follows that an equally or more complex (and 
likely weakened) socio-political governance of employment relationships will also result.Gereffi 
et al. (2005) indirectly flag a different analysis for the social aspects of governance when they 
point out that even the tangible materialities of product and production control may be subject to 
‘institutional’ shaping by national politics, customs, and regulations. Moreover, it is one thing to 
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increase business control by ‘codifying’, as they put it, the technicalities of products and 
production processes; it is quite another to expect social relationships and institutions to be as 
amenable to effective social control through the implementation of codes of conduct. Yet, such 
similarity of control for social aspects seems to be assumed by some advocates of CoC 
enforcement (Pedersen and Andersen, 2006; Arnold and Bowie, 2003; 2007). Gereffi et al.’s 
classification does also include ‘innovative’ measures:— shifting from an auditing and 
compliance mentality to a more collaborative approach with suppliers (Hartman et al., 2003; 
Mamic, 2005; Yu, 2009)—. However, these are best suited to small and direct supply contracting, 
while most clothing MNCs today manage the sources of thousands of suppliers worldwide 
through various forms of indirect relationships (Gereffi and Frederick, 2010), with multi-level 
intermediaries and their subcontractors’ networks operating in various national socio-political 
environments. This complexity not only hinders the top-down governance in the chain, but 
further, as the next section shows, it fosters the convergence of interest amongst these actors to 
act against Western brands’ and retailers’ social agendas. 
 
ii) Economic contradictions 
Vogel (2006; 2010) claims that CSR still leaves room for unethical players and suggests 
that ‘ethical’ reputation has little influence on total sales. Indeed, brands shamed by anti-
sweatshop campaigns have experienced significant expansion of retail outlets and sales. 
Primark’s EU and UK stores have increased from 66 locations in 1994 to 220 as of May 2011, 
while Tesco’s clothing sales have increased by 14% between 2009 and 2010 (WarOnWant, 2006; 
Primark, 2011; Tesco, 2010: 21-22). The dynamics of final consumers’ purchasing needs appear 
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to trump ethics, especially in Western and Northern countries, which require MNCs to provide 
consumers with more styles at unchanged or cheaper prices. 
Moreover, priorities in the chain of economic governance conflict with those in social 
governance chains for CoCs. Wearing their efficiency-management hats, MNCs try to balance 
low transaction costs/direct control with degrees of flexibility in commissioning and controlling 
supplies. MNCs’ economic tactics also involve spreading supply risks by stretching the supply 
base to many countries, thereby maintaining supply flexibility and a quick response to their 
orders by spreading them among many suppliers. Multi-tier supply chains are, up to a point, able 
to meet these economic demands. But as we show later, they create significant difficulties for 
social governance of chains through CoCs.  
 Any reputational gains from ‘doing good’ lie with the brands (Pedersen and Andersen, 
2006), whereas most of the cost of compliance is borne by suppliers with less to gain (Welford 
and Frost, 2006). To a large extent, the contradiction of MNCs’ imposing CoCs—, yet being 
unwilling to share the cost with suppliers, —hinders CoC implementation (Jenkins, 2001; MSN, 
2004; Yu, 2008). Suppliers are unconvinced of a business case for ethical practices and tend to 
evade code rules (Egels-Zanden, 2007; Roberts, Engardio and Bernstein, 2006). Egels-Zanden’s 
study of several Chinese toy factories found retailers and suppliers having shared economic 
incentives to decrease levels of compliance because costs are thereby lowered, while workers are 
compensated for accepting these reductions by keeping their jobs. 
However, such worker obedience and quiescence is called into question by the 
overwhelming evidence of the increasing number of worker strikes and labour shortages in 
Chinese and Vietnamese manufacturing sectors  (Cai and Wang, 2010; Chan, 2009; Kam Wing, 
2010; Clarke, 2006; Sunoo, 2007). In Vietnam, 90% of rural-urban migrant workers find a job 
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within one month of arrival, and almost a quarter get a job within the first week (ILO, 2009b). 
This evidence of ‘loose’ labour markets limits the claim that workers ignore codes because they 
fear dismissal. Our evidence from several cases in Vietnam, presented in Section 4 below, offers 
a more complex explanation for workers’ collusive silence about their working conditions. 
 
iii) Institutional contradictions 
Most strikes in Vietnam since 2000 are wildcat strikes, often in foreign-invested 
enterprises (Clarke, 2006; Sunoo, 2007) although such enterprises accounted for less than 3% of 
Vietnamese enterprises in 2008 (GSO, 2009). This militancy suggests that Vietnamese workers 
might be sufficiently empowered to demand better working conditions, though not through 
official and legal industrial relations procedures. Despite compliance with international labour 
standards often being a condition of supply to Western buyers, evidence of Southern 
governments’ positive enforcement of those standards is scarce, even where labour law 
stipulations are comprehensive (Chan and Wang, 2004). These states seem to prioritise increased 
exports and employment above improved labour standards. Unlike China, garment sectors are 
strategic priorities in Vietnam as the second largest export industry (Schaumburg-Muller, 2009; 
VISTA, 2010). In January 2009 the minimum wage level in Vietnam was less than half that of 
China and Indonesia and about a third of the minimum wage in Thailand (ILO, 2009a) 
The MNC codes’ key provision of a right to freedom of association clashes with the 
restriction to officially recognised bodies in Vietnam and China (Clarke, Lee and Chi, 2007; 
Josephs, 1995). Any anomalous, independent workplace unions are effectively non-adversarial 
and pro-management, yet such entities can still appear as a panacea to supersede and facilitate 
other unenforceable standards. Stronger, independent workplace trade unions could themselves 
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press for the improvements in working conditions for which the complex apparatus of CoC 
strives. The experience of MNC-fostered unionisation by Reebok in China (Yu, 2008) illustrates 
the potential for—and problems with—such a strategy. 
 
iv) Obstacles to more authentic workplace bargaining 
 It is tempting to draw parallels between Vietnam and the similar upsurge of ‘unofficial’ 
worker militancy in China, especially as this onslaught in China has led some Western MNCs to 
attempt to complement their CoCs with worker organisations in their suppliers’ plants (Yu, 
2008). Clarke et al. (2007: 565) suggest two possible solutions to Vietnam’s systemic problems 
with industrial relations: 1) enforcing existing legal rights through more direct control of 
collective bargaining and conflict resolution in the workplace by the official union hierarchy (the 
Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL)), without a separate role for workplace union 
organizations; or 2) the state delegating terms and conditions of employment to VGCL to 
negotiate directly with employers, —potentially increasing the role of workplace trade union 
organizations. In either case, resolving the wildcat militancy stemming from official workplace 
union ineffectiveness would need both increased accountability to members and appropriate 
skills and resources for representatives to bargain effectively with managements. 
 
MNCs could promote the second of Clarke et al.’s solutions, as Western ‘brand’ firms in China 
have shown the potential for (and problems with) such a strategy. As commentators on the 
Reebok Chinese experiment observe, local and internal monitoring and problem resolution could 
be more economical than the present system of hiring expensive auditors to report code 
violations, which then require MNC intervention. However, with Reebok’s 2001 international 
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‘worker representation initiatives’, the first democratically elected workers committee at the 
Reebok plant in Fuzhou soon declined into the more conventional and subservient role which 
typifies Chinese unions: formally recognising employees’ legal rights and interests, but 
‘respecting investor’s interests and promoting enterprise development’ (Yu, 2008: 523). Like the 
official unions, the Reebok union’s perspective and elected representatives became dominated by 
the management and its role reduced to ‘boosting employee loyalty, morale and productive 
efﬁciency’(Yu, 2008: 524). On one interpretation, the new union became, little more than a way 
of relieving Reebok from ‘expensive monitoring of its labour-related 'codes’ (Yu, 2008: 523-4), 
but Adidas’s takeover of Reebok removed the MNC’s human rights representative, who might 
have monitored plant relationships to prevent the union’s degeneration (Anonymous, n.d.). The 
need to gain the support of the official union organisation meant that the latter coached the new 
union’s officers and oversaw its policies (Yu, 2008). After describing the realities of plant-level 
industrial relations in the Vietnamese cases studied here, we will return to the policy options for 
strengthening workplace unions through, or instead of, CoCs in our conclusion. 
 
3. Apparel industry and Vietnamese case study firms 
i) The cases and methodology 
In the apparel industry, South-east Asian contracting businesses are less interested in 
vertically-integrated supply chains than in competitive out-sourcing of orders to many 
‘independent’ entities; owners each have their own policies and interests. Between 2008 and 
2010, Dong Hoang investigated the implementation and impacts of buyer-firms’ CoCs at three 
apparel companies, representing the three dominant types of garment companies in Vietnam: a 
foreign (Korean) owned subsidiary (FOE), a state-owned firm (SOE), and one domestic, 
privately owned enterprise (DPE). Each had CoC agreements, specified by large international 
13 
 
brands and retailers. Such larger-than-average garment firms are more likely to have the 
resources to conform to CoCs. While the DPE was fully privatised, the SOE is still in the 
privatisation process, with the state owning almost one third of its shares.  
To establish the precise rationales of CoC non-compliance more precisely than some 
other studies, twenty semi-structured interviews of senior managers and union representatives, as 
well as between five and six production workers were completed at each of the three companies 
on the first visit in 2008. In 2010, the information arising from these interviews was cross-
checked against three interviews with vendors sourcing from the SOE and DPE, but not the FOE, 
which is dedicated to production for its overseas mother company. The SOE and FOE, identified 
from the signatories to the Social Accountability Initiative (SA8000), produce garments for many 
different product brands and comply with multiple codes of conduct.CoCs and other 
documentation provided by the companies were examined and observations of the factory 
workplaces were made. A representative from a Vietnamese NGO working with international 
NGOs to promote CSR was also interviewed. Half of the interviewed workers were identified 
through social networks, friends or relatives, and half through snowball sampling from already 
interviewed workers. These methods appear to provide reliability, as selected workers from both 
methods provided similar views on CoC implementation. Long working days for these workers 
made telephone, rather than face-to-face, interviews necessary. 
 
These companies share similar sets of CoCs as the suppliers of almost identical Western 
customers including Gap, Wal-Mart, American Eagle Outfitters (AEO), Kohl’s, Sears, Target, 
C&A, Zara (Inditex), Columbia, Timberland, Levi Strauss & Co., and Perry Ellis International. 
Each customer has its own CoC, so more customers means a higher number of codes to be 
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observed. The SOE and DPE supply thirty or so brands each, while the FOE only supplies three 
major US customers: Gap, Wal-Mart, and AEO. While they supply the same brands, the three 
Vietnamese companies differ in their supply chain position. The FOE is a first tier supplier, 
headquartered in South Korea, with a long-term contract with its brands and retailers, while the 
two Vietnamese-owned companies, the SOE and DPE, are both 100% subcontracted through 
vendors, operate in the second, or sometimes third tier of the supply chain. These differences 
significantly influence their compliance with buyers’ codes. 
 
 
 
ii) Gains and limitations for women workers from corporate codes 
 
Workers at all three companies commend some positive changes resulting from the 
implementation of CoCs: the abolition of maternity registration and of restricted access to toilets, 
plus improvements in safety and a better physical work environment. Substantial investment in 
upgrading workshops’ infrastructure and health and safety measures were evident in the SOE and 
DPI to attract foreign customers. While the FOE is only five years old, it is well-equipped with 
modern workplace facilities. Workers at the FOE claim that previously, they had to apply for a 
‘toilet card’ from supervisors in order to go to the toilets, but CoC audits by clients helped to end 
this inhumane practice. As one worker expressed with relief, ‘now we can go freely (FOE line 
worker interview). Previously, the SOE and DPE required women workers to apply for a 
‘maternity card’ one year before pregnancy. An SOE manager reported that the company’s first 
audit drew the fact that such a policy violates human rights to management’s attention; the 
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company has since removed the regulation. Such improvements and the implementation of 
women workers’ rights can be attributed to the codes and are appreciated by employees: ‘Things 
are now nicer and cleaner’ (FOE line worker interview). However, pregnant workers and workers 
with small children have to work hours as long as other employees, but report that they have 
insufficient time for childcare. Moreover, CoCs seem to focus primarily on shop-floor workers, 
to the exclusion of those working outside of production chain operations. Each operation will 
have a sampling workshop with between 20 and 50 workers. Workers at sampling workshops 
claimed they had to work harder and even longer hours than their production line colleagues, and 
have never encountered CoC auditors. As one  claimed: ‘CoC is only applied for production line 
workers’ (DPE sampling worker ). There has been no sign of improvement in these trades for 
years. 
 
The overtime burden on employees was hardly affected, remaining obligatory— and at 
twice the national legal level— at the two Vietnamese firms, but not paid at higher overtime 
rates. These workers, however, do earn higher wages than their FOE counterparts, who only earn 
just above minimum wage and moreover, suffer strict work discipline and high-tension 
relationships with their line managers. Young and pregnant workers have to work overtime like 
other workers. Workers’ experiences influence their trust in CoCs, thus they perceive only 
limited gains from them. Child labour, forced labour, and minimum wage compliance remain 
sensitive issues for their employers’ MNC clients. The latter would not compromise if suppliers 
violated these standards, but overtime work is regarded as being ‘in the nature of this industry’, 
so excessive working hours are viewed more flexibly. 
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iii) Compliance and evasion 
Of the three firms studied, only the FOE complied with most of the key standards in the 
labour law and buyers’ codes, such as working hours, overtime wages (i.e. 150%-200% of basic 
wage), and various maternity benefits for women workers ( reduced working time, paid leave for 
medical check-ups, and maternity leave). One FOE worker acknowledged that neither she nor 
other workers experienced problems claiming maternity benefits. Workers regularly work eight 
hours a day, six days per week, with every Sunday off. Required overtime is often only for a 
short period in order to complete orders, with overtime payments conforming to the national law. 
Workers are paid at least minimum wage, rather than the piece-rate wage at SOE and DPE, as 
their monthly salaries. 
An FOE manager linked the company’s strong commitment to clients’ labour standards 
requirements to the dedication of its production to only three large brands. This direct buyer-
supplier relationship strengthens the supplier’s commitment to social responsibility, as the 
manager said: ‘We have long term relationship with our clients. They often visit the factory here 
and we are not going to betray them… If we have problems, we can always discuss'.(HR & 
Compliance manager, FOE ).  
The other two companies, the SOE and the DPE, supply the same brands, but through 
contracts with vendors. These companies cheat on the compliance requirements in order to pass 
buyers’ audits and satisfy certification organisations. The success of their deceptions has even led 
to CSR awards from both a local NGO and the industry itself, including a certificate of merit for 
social performance, which confirms that the methods developed to deceive monitoring 
organisations have become systematic, institutionalised, and invisible. 
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At the SOE, line managers operate with a two-book system. One is for actual attendance and 
work hours for management purposes. Another set contains fake attendance and work hours for 
the benefit of the auditors. Workers are expected to give positive information about the company 
in their interviews with auditors. Most workers will tell the auditors that they don’t have to work 
overtime very often, and that weekly overtime is not more than 12 hours: 
‘Sometimes when auditors stay back late [at factories], we are even allowed to go 
 home at 5 pm. When auditors are not there, everything is as usual’ (SOE production 
worker). At the DPE, there is a more sophisticated way of cheating on work hours, through an 
automatic timing system for checking attendance. The company asks workers to check out at the 
approved times, e.g. 5 pm or 6 pm every day, and then return to work as normal. 
CoC violations in these two factories include the use of casual child labour, worker 
discrimination, excessive and mandatory overtime, and failure to pay overtime premiums, as 
found in previous studies of compliance (Smith, Nguyen and Tran, 2006: 17; Welford and Frost, 
2006: 169; Egels-Zanden, 2007: 52). However, our cases confirm that effective enforcement is 
particularly difficult without a direct channel of command between the (Western) buying firm 
and a network of suppliers at various stages of the production chain. Greater monitoring of CoC 
performance seems to make little improvement where contracts are made between subcontractors 
and vendors, not the brands. Often, subcontractors can only be qualified as suppliers once they 
pass brands’ audits, but Western brands rely to a large extent on vendors declaring their 
subcontractors’ identities. While on some levels, this occurs, the monitoring of subcontractors’ 
social performance during production remains problematic, as most audits are one-time events. 
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Interviews with three vending companies, one based in Hong Kong and the other two in 
South Korea (SK1 and SK2), also show that code monitoring is predominantly the brand firms’ 
business, not the vendors. By disclosing subcontractors’ identities to the brands, the vendors 
disengage themselves from monitoring CoCs. All three vendors obtained approval for their 
selected subcontractors from their MNC clients. Once approved, vendors can source products 
from the subcontractors. Occasionally, if subcontractor X fails the client A’s audit and is 
disqualified, the vendors will just submit subcontractor Y to the client A as a replacement. In the 
meantime the vendors still use the failed subcontractor X to submit to client B, hoping the 
subcontractor will pass client B’s audit. This process is repeated for each client and each 
subcontractor, creating a complication of overlapping audits and monitoring —sometimes, as a 
manager complained, up to 10 audits a week, with almost 40 different type of document 
submitted to auditors. 
 
Among the three vendors, the Hong Kong firm has combined product quality control 
(QC) and CoC monitoring in the daily job of QC staff. But completing a CoC checklist is clearly 
not their priority. :  
…if in a peak period the factories have to meet many delivery deadlines, they increase 
overtime work, hire workers without signing contracts… that is what we can ignore. If 
we feel it is not to serious we will just disregard it. We are not too difficult on everything 
because it also affects our business' (QC inspector, HK vending company, HK vending 
company.) 
The two SK firms show no interest in CoC monitoring and ignore labour practices on shop 
floors. One inspector from SK2 said:  
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 ‘We’ve got to make sure they do it correctly as per our samples and complete the 
 order on time. The other things [labour standards] … we don’t have to do anything 
 about it. It has been approved’ (QC inspector, SK2 vending company).  
The complexity of supply networks with multiple buyers and subcontractors enables the 
intermediaries to act as coordinators without being subjected to any obligations other than 
identifying their subcontractors. Even the initial audits by MNCs can be pre-empted by 
Vietnamese subcontractors-vendors’ collusion, as the next section explains. 
 
4) Convergent interests and trade union dysfunctions in CoC avoidance 
Subcontractors’ deceptions cannot succeed without substantial support and ineffective 
regulation from other economic and social actors in the supply chains, including vendor-supplier 
connivance and worker manager collusion; ineffective regulation also stems from dysfunctional 
trade unionism in the workplace. We now describe the incidence of these factors in the 
companies investigated. Third parties hired by Western customer firms conduct most audits, but 
intermediary vendors also engage them to carry out ‘prior-audit preparations’ of the factories. 
Vendor firms prepare the suppliers for official CoC procedures by taking them through dummy 
audits. As one manager said, ‘vendors are usually “‘supportive”’ as they are also afraid of not 
being able to sell products to their clients (retailers)’(Deputy Director, SOE). Subcontractor-
vendor collusion aims to promote ‘mutual interest’, as a factory manager put it, between the two 
supplying firms with the MNCs’ powers limited to an often-ineffective initial ‘approval process’. 
According to a DPE manager, vendors help to cover up for subcontractors because 
vendors themselves sometimes create delays. For example, vendors procure fabric and materials, 
often from abroad, then deliver to the subcontractors to cut, sew, and pack finished products. 
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Delays in delivering these materials shorten the time subcontractors have for implementing 
production, as delivery deadlines to Western buyers are usually unalterable. At the top, MNCs 
also deliberately postpone orders to the last minute to capture as much market information as 
possible (Chopra and Meindl, 2007; Insight Investment, 2004). Our investigation highlights how 
other economic actors also transmit burdens down the supply chain to subcontractors. 
In pursuing their economic interests, subcontractors often take ‘more orders than they can 
actually do’ (SK2 vendor). Companies like the SOE and DPE then force workers into excessive 
overtime to cope with resulting ‘over-capacity’ workloads and with short lead-times from their 
direct (vendors) and indirect (MNC) buyers. So some sweatshop conditions are not simply 
generated by a single dominant actor in the supply chain, like MNCs, but rather by a 
convergence of interests amongst various economic actors throughout the chains. On the one 
hand, supply firm managements expect workers to give positive information, as one DPE worker 
reported that: ‘The company teaches us what to say to auditors.’ Yet, on the other hand, workers 
support their companies in cheating auditors because they are frightened the buyers might 
terminate production contracts, and because they want their companies to be competitive to get 
orders from large buyers. 
Workers see themselves and managers as on the same side– ‘we’, as they say, ‘try to win 
orders from big brands’. An SOE worker explains that  
‘Our job[s] relies on signing long lasting orders so that we can have higher 
 income… [A f]Few years ago we were inexperienced as we just started to produce 
 branded products but now we kind of ‘“know how” so we manage to sign  larger 
orders’.  
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Payment systems have a big influence on this tacit collusion. At the DPE, workers get 
competitive pay, as the company manages to pass the audits done for large buyers such as Gap, 
Levi Strauss, Columbia, and AEO. Large orders mean longer periods for workers to know the 
job, increase their speeds and, through piece-work, raise their earnings, increasing workers’ level 
of commitment and loyalty to the company. 
 Smarter auditors sometimes select younger, more naïve workers and, on occasion, other 
employees, who are tired of lying, may tell the truth. However, most employees are well-
schooled by their companies in what to say—and what not to say—to outsiders: ‘If we tell 
auditors the truth, the company will soon run out of business and we are out of job’ (DPE worker 
). At both the SOE and DPE, workers are well informed about audit results, awards, and 
sanctions, and feel obliged to say positive things about the company for the ‘collective good’:  
‘We all know who have been asked by auditors. If the result is bad and if the client stops 
a contract with us, those workers would feel as if they had taken away other workers’ 
opportunity for a good income’ income. (SOE line supervisor) 
A DPE manager summarised the commercial motivations behind CoC compliance: ‘We 
invest in facilities and infrastructure to give a good impression to our customers when they visit 
factories,... to get orders and charge them higher price’. In a mirror image of more mighty 
Western MNC counterparts, these supplier firms see manipulation of their CSR credentials as 
tactics to improve their competitive prospects. Paradoxically however, although the FOE 
complies with more CoC and labour law requirements, its workers are less content than those at 
the other two firms because of levels of take-home pay and severe work-time regulations, 
including earlier attendance and exclusions for lateness.The apparently ‘unholy alliance’ between 
workers and the managements who, in other respects, exploit them is also due to the absence of 
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other social actors with whom they could collaborate. Social stakeholders like the government, 
NGOs, trade unions, and labour activists have negligible influence on suppliers’ social 
performance. Labour law enforcement by government bodies is almost non-existent in the three 
companies, and in fact, Vietnamese labour law is considered as strong and protective of workers 
(Smith et al., 2006). It incorporates seventeen ILO conventions, covering most key labour 
standards, except the right to freedom of association. The establishment of a company’s trade 
union is mandatory in both Vietnamese and foreign invested enterprises. Formal mechanisms for 
handling employee grievances are stipulated via either a ‘conciliation council’ at the enterprise, 
or district or city level bodies. Legislation allows strikes on a majority vote of employees if these 
actions fail. However other reports (Clarke et al., 2007; Dang Lan, 1995) and our own interviews 
suggest that these procedures have little or no credibility with workers. At the DPE, the union 
chairman is a deputy director of the company; at the SOE, the chairwoman is the deputy head of 
the business department; the FOE management simply appointed a company nurse to that 
position. Most interviewed workers in the three companies regard their companies’ unions as 
useless. 
Workers at the FOE organised wildcat strikes through informal and, often secretive, 
leaders, but such ad-hoc collective actions don’t always succeed. As an FOE worker explained: 
‘Sometimes we get increase [pay] but sometimes we get nothing and have to come back to 
work’. This worker’s experience exemplifies Clarke et al.’s (2007) finding that informal-worker 
organisation does not seem to secure wider or more permanent grievance representation. 
Officials blame worker ignorance of proper procedures, thus in 2008, the government passed 
decree 11/2008/ND-CP, making individuals and groups committing illegal strikes responsible for 
compensating employers for resulting losses. This regulation checked the growth in wildcat 
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strikes and assured employers and investors of a stable economic environment, but has had little 
influence on workers’ motivations for deciding whether or not to strike, although it may have 
affected the success of such ‘illegal’ actions. 
Unlike the FOE, the DPE and SOE have never experienced strikes, even though these 
companies violate standards in both national laws and clients’ codes. However, workplace 
unionism is potentially important in combating firms’ non-compliance with standards, as 
indicated by attitudes at the more militant FOE. Repeated strikes and worker-management 
disputes there led one worker to say that there was ‘no way’ they would cooperate with managers 
to hide breaches of labour standards. 
 
Conclusions and proposals 
The evidence from these three Vietnamese companies confirms that criticisms of weaknesses 
in codes derive partly from assumptions that principal-agent relationships govern, or could 
govern, their implementation. Instead, hierarchical transmission of MNC principles and policies 
is restricted and subverted by the network character of supply chains, inducing convergent 
interests in the multi-lateral relationships between suppliers, workers, managements, and by the 
tacit influence of the dysfunctional labour relations system. Multi-level contracting means orders 
and supplying contractors proliferate beneath the immediate vendor-buyer transactions into 
second and third levels of the supply chain, preventing unilateral, ‘top-down’ code management. 
Any code implementation is further complicated by convergent interests in deceit and avoidance 
amongst vendors, subcontractors and, often, workers themselves. Avoidance of CoCs and 
potentially relevant national labour codes is further facilitated by management control of 
workplace unions. 
24 
 
 
These considerations change the focus from the roles usually depicted, ie: superior MNC 
powers and capacities with workers cast as either beneficiaries of CoCs, or victims of their 
inadequate implementation. At least in the Vietnamese context, the roles of vendors, factory 
managers, unions, state bureaucracies, and the workers themselves, create competition, conflict 
and collusion, which subvert CoCs’ regulation and operation. Consistent with Murray (2004), 
however, our evidence suggests that CoCs may be a potentially influential variable in a wider 
process of development, if accompanied by fuller recognition and strengthening of workers’ 
collective voice in the workplace. 
 
One initiative, the Better Work programme of the ILO and International Finance 
Corporation, aims to go one step beyond CoC auditing. Approved by Vietnam’s labour and 
government bodies, it offers post-inspection training of workers and managers on freedom of 
association/bargaining, health and safety, compensation, discrimination, and working hours, with 
reports sent to factories’ MNC customers. On working hours, Better Work reports admit that 
combating almost universal illegal overtime depends upon structural changes, general 
productivity improvement and changes in MNC buyers’ requirements. It refers the even thornier 
issue of workplace union bargaining to separate initiatives involving the Vietnam General 
Confederation of Labour (VGCL). As of December 2010, 64 of 3,174 apparel factories, covering 
between 5% and 13% of the industry labour force, had volunteered to participate in Better Work 
(ILO, 2011: 6; 19). 
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Progress on these fronts, like Wang’s (2005) proposal to replace formulaic ‘compliance 
and evasion’ rituals and ethics of MNC CoCs with ‘organisational integrity’ –requiring supplying 
enterprises take on direct responsibilities —would require a raft of both major and minor reforms 
involving various actors and institutions in economic and social governance. In the economic 
sphere, buyers would need to cooperate, as in the IDS recommendation to the Ethical Trading 
Initiative, for joint coordination by retailers and MNC brands. More effective social governance 
would require VGCL cooperation, at least to publicise workers’ statutory rights (Smith et al., 
2006). Vietnamese officialdom already recognises a more explicit role for CoCs in labour 
regulations. At the ‘Stakeholder Roundtable meeting on CSR initiatives’ held in Hanoi on  6th 
September 2010, a government official supported CSR regulation because ‘ 
'It fills the gaps in governments’ enforcement capacity: human and financial resources for 
inspecting and enforcing the implementation of the national law are limited’. ' (Nguyen and Ngo, 
2010, p.: 26)., Making further use of this tolerance would mean persuading the VGCL that 
reforming their negligible role in the strike-torn private sector should involve semi-autonomous 
union organisation and regulation in the private and foreign-invested firms, complementing the 
rights-compliance culture in the state-owned sector with more of an interest- bargaining ethos 
(Clarke et al, 2007). Support would also be needed from Western MNCs (together with their 
east-Asian intermediaries) to pressure state authorities and violators of CoC provisions and state 
labour standards. MNC auditors would need to notify both Western paymasters and local 
ministry of labour (MoLISA) or official union authorities of glaring violations. MNCs could 
further the independence of workplace union organisations from their suppliers’ managements. 
Human rights advisers of the kind attempted briefly by Reebok in China could act as quasi-
ombudsmen. The integrity of workplace union elections could be improved by making external 
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bodies, such as MoLISA and the MNCs, rather than the official union hierarchy, responsible for 
their proper conduct and independence from managements. 
 
These socio-political reforms would be futile without addressing the economic causes of 
CoC and labour law violations, that is, changing the economic governance of supply chains. 
Lower and middle tier suppliers would need to be engaged in the social agenda by 
comprehensively incorporating the most significant labour standards checks into the more 
frequent and rigorous quality control inspections. Equally important are inter-business 
agreements, to help reduce those economic pressures on supplier firms, which currently induce 
cheating and deception of auditors. Western MNCs, plus the giant retailers which they supply, 
could agree a compact, similar to Fairtrade principles, for relatively minor reductions in profit 
margins and delivery times to finance the small wage increases sought by workers to reduce the 
need for overtime work. Reducing these pressures should allow more ‘organisational integrity’ in 
the supply chain and savings in the monitoring costs of the present complex (but erratic) CoC 
system. Savings could, via small levies or transaction charges on garment exports paid by all 
suppliers or vendors, create a fund to cover the costs of the genuine, private sector, new 
collective bargaining institutions, or to compensate suppliers, whose intransigent MNC 
customers refuse to raise contracted prices. 
 
 Such changes would clearly require considerable time, political momentum and 
activism. Not all may be achievable together. But the Better Work initiative shows there is scope 
for reforms. Western firms, NGOs, and campaigners could lobby for, or agree to those changes in 
which Vietnamese state agencies are already showing interest. By demonstrating their 
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commitment, Western business interests and campaigners could encourage local actors to attempt 
the other, more demanding, reforms required. 
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